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Abstract
The government may regulate a market by obtaining partial own-
ership in a firm. This type of socially concerned firm behaves as a com-
bined profit and social surplus maximizer. We investigate the presence
of a socially concerned firm in the framework of a Bertrand-Edgeworth
duopoly with capacity constraints. In particular, we determine the
mixed-strategy equilibrium of this game and relate it to both the stan-
dard and the mixed versions of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game. In con-
trast to other results in the literature we find that full privatization is
the socially best outcome, that is the optimal level of public ownership
is equal to zero.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper Merrill and Schneider (1966) investigated the welfare
effect of a public firm in a quantity-setting oligopoly. The case of a so-called
semi-public firm or socially concerned firm with an objective function ob-
tained as a weighted sum of firm’s profit and social surplus was analyzed by
Matsumura (1998) for which he determined the optimal governmental share
and found an interior solution, that is the pure public firm case and the
standard profit-maximizing case does not emerge in equilibrium. Similar in-
vestigations have been carried out for the heterogeneous goods price-setting
duopoly game by Barcéna-Ruiz and Sedano (2011) in which again the optimal
governmental share was positive.
The current paper investigates the homogeneous good price-setting semi-
public duopoly game. The simpler mixed duopoly game with a purely public
firm was investigated by Balogh and Tasnái (2012) for which they found that
an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists in contrast to the duopoly with
a purely private firm, henceforth referred to as the standard case. However,
since in the semi-public setting both firms objective functions have a profit
component, there is a capacity region for which a pure-strategy equilibrium
does not exist. Hence, the analysis of the semi-public case becomes much
more difficult. Tasnádi (2013) gave a necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and established the existence of
a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
In this paper we derive certain properties of the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium and determine the mixed-strategy equilibrium in explicit form for the
case of symmetric capacity constraints and linear demand. Based on our re-
sults we conclude that the socially optimal governmental share is zero, and
thus the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game results in higher social surplus
than the proper semi-public Bertrand-Edgeworth game. In this respect the
Bertrand-Edgeworth framework behaves more market like than the Cournot
setting or the differentiated version of the Bertrand framework.
2 The framework
Concerning the demand function, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (i) D intersects the horizontal axis at quantity a and the
vertical axis at price b; (ii) D is strictly decreasing, concave and twice-
continuously differentiable on (0, b); (iii) D is right-continuous at 0 and left-
continuous at b; and (iv) D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
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We shall denote by P the inverse demand function, that is P (q) = D−1 (q)
for 0 < q ≤ a, P (0) = b, and P (q) = 0 for all q > a.
We denote the set of firms by {1, 2}, where 1 will be the semi-public firm
and 2 the private firm.
Assumption 2. The firms face zero unit cost up to their capacity constraints
k1 és k2.1 For simplicity we assume that the semi-public firm is not capable
of serving the entire demand, i.e. k1 < a.2
We shall denote by pc the market clearing price, by pM the price set
by a monopolist without capacity constraints, and by pMi the price set by a
monopolist with capacity constraint ki, where i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e. pc = P (k1 + k2),
pM = arg maxp∈[0,b] pD (p), and pMi = arg maxp∈[0,b] pmin{D (p) , ki}. In what
follows p1, p2 ∈ [0, b] stand for the prices set by the firms.
For all i ∈ {1, 2} we shall denote by pmi = arg maxp∈[0,b] pDri (p) the unique
revenue maximizing price on the firms’ residual demand curves Dri (p) =
(D(p)− kj)+, where j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i, if Dri (0) > 0. Let pmi = 0 if
Dri (0) = 0. The inverse residual demand curves will be denoted by R1 and
R2. Clearly, pc and pmi are well defined whenever Assumptions 1 and 2 are
satisfied. We have pMi ≥ pM > pmi . Furthermore, k1 < a implies pm2 > 0. It
can be easily verified that from ki > kj it follows that pmi > pmj .
Let us denote by pdi the smallest price pi for which pi min{ki, Di (pi)} =
pmi D
r
i (p
m
i ), whenever this equation has a solution.3 Provided that the private
firm has ‘sufficient’ capacity (i.e. pc < pm2 ), then if it is a profit-maximizer, it
is indifferent to whether serving residual demand at price level pmi or selling
min{ki, Di
(
pdi
)} at the lower price level pdi . By Deneckere and Kovenock
(1992, Lemma 1) we know that pdi > pdj if ki > kj.
Since for the interesting price region the low-price firm cannot satisfy
the whole demand, its consumers have to be rationed so that the residual
demand of the high-price firm is a function of the consumers served by the
low-price firms. The most frequently employed rationing rule is the so-called
efficient rationing rule, which is reasonable if there is a secondary market for
the duopolists’ products.
Assumption 3. We assume efficient rationing on the market.
1The main assumption here is that firms have identical unit costs, assuming zero unit
costs is just a matter of normalization since firms will produce to order.
2In case of k1 ≥ a a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, which is not necessarily unique;
however, sales happen only at price zero.
3The equation defining pdi has a solution if, for instance, pmi ≥ pc, which will be the
case in our analysis when we will refer to pdi .
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Under efficient rationing the demand faced by the firms i ∈ {1, 2} equals
∆i (D, p1, k1, p2, k2) =

D (pi) if pi < pj,
ki
k1+k2
D (pi) if p = pi = pj,
(D (pi)− kj)+ , if pi > pj.
In case of equal prices we assume for simplicity that firms split demand in
proportion to their capacities. However, we could have admitted a large class
of tie-breaking rules, the only tie-breaking rules that have to be avoided are
those ones giving priority to one of the two firms.
We turn to specifying the firms payoff functions. Let α ∈ (0, 1) be the
weight of the surplus-maximizing component in the payoff function of the
semi-public firm, which might be a function of the governmental share in
the equity of firm 1. We do not need to analyze the extreme cases of α = 0
and α = 1, which correspond to the already analyzed cases of the stan-
dard Bertrand-Edgeworth game and to the mixed version of the Bertrand-
Edgeworth game investigated by Balogh and Tasnádi (2012). The payoff
function of the semi-public firm is given by
pi1(p1, p2) = (1− α)p1 min {k1,∆1 (D, p1, k1, p2, k2)}+
α
∫ min{(D(pj)−ki)+,kj}
0
Rj(q)dq + α
∫ min{a,ki}
0
P (q)dq, (1)
where 0 ≤ pi ≤ pj ≤ b. Observe that because of efficient rationing social
surplus is only a function of the largest price at which sales are realized.
The private firm maximzes its profits:
pi2(p1, p2) = p2 min {k2,∆2 (D, p1, k1, p2, k2)} . (2)
In an analogous way to price pm2 , which maximizes the private firms profits
when serving residual demand, we define the payoff maximizing price ps1 for
the semi-public firm when it faces residual demand:
ps1 = arg max
p1∈[0,b]
{
(1− α)p1Dr1 (p1) + α
∫ D(p1)
0
P (q)dq
}
.
It can be checked that ps1 is determined uniquely and that ps1 < pm1 under
Asummptions 1-3.
Concerning the pure-strategy equilibrium of the capacity constrained
Bertrand-Edgeworth game with a socially concerned firm, henceforth called
the semi-public Bertrand-Edgeworth game, the following statement has been
established by Tasnádi (2013).
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Established fact 1. Under Assumption 1-3, the semi-public Bertrand-
Edgeworth game has a pure-strategy equilibrium if and only if max{ps1, pm2 } ≤
pc. If a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, then it is given by
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
c = P (k1 + k2). (3)
The existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be established by em-
ploying a recent existence theorem demonstrated by Prokopovych and Yan-
nelis (2014, Theorem 3).
If a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, the standard, the mixed and the
semi-public Bertrand-Edgeworth games all result in the same outcome in
which the firms produce at their capacity constraints and the equilibrium
price is the market clearing price. Therefore, in what follows we focus on the
case in which a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist.
3 Some properties of the mixed-strategy equi-
librium
In this section we assume that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist,
i.e. max{ps1, pm2 } > pc. We shall denote by (ϕ1, ϕ2) be an arbitrary mixed-
strategy equilibrium. Let pi = sup supp(ϕi) and pi = inf supp(ϕi), where
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Observe that pm2 > pc implies p2 ≥ pd2 > pc because the private firms
profits at price pm2 are at least as large as at price pd2. Hence, p1 ≥ pd2.
Furthermore, if ps1 > pc ≥ pm2 , then p1 > pc and p2 > pc.
We present some lemmas concerning the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and max{ps1, pm2 } > pc, we obtain
that ϕ1 and ϕ2 cannot have both an atom at the same price.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a price p ∈ [0, b] for which ϕ1(p) > 0 and
ϕ2(p) > 0. However, this would imply because of p1 > p
c and p
2
> pc that
both firms i ∈ {1, 2} would be better off by unilaterally shifting probability
mass from price p to p− ε; a contradiction.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and max{ps1, pm2 } > pc, for any
mixed-strategy equilibrium (ϕ1, ϕ2) we have p1 = ps1 > p2 or p1 < p2 = pm2 or
min {ps1, pm2 } ≤ p1 = p2.
Proof. Let p1 > p2. If p1 > ps1, then the semi-public firm could benefit from
setting a price below p1 because of the strict concavity of its residual payoff
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function. If p1 < ps1, then the semi-public firm would make more profits by
setting price ps1 than setting any other in (p2, ps1); a contradiction. Hence, in
case of p1 > p2 we must have p1 = ps1.
In an analogous way it can be shown that if p1 < p2, we must have
p2 = p
m
2 .
Suppose that min {ps1, pm2 } > p1 = p2. Then since in equilibrium at least
one of the mixed strategies cannot have an atom at p1 = p2, say ϕi ({pi}) =
0, firm j 6= i could increase its payoff by setting either price ps1 or pm2 ; a
contradiction.
Lemma 3. Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 be satisfied and let (ϕ1, ϕ2) be a
mixed-strategy equilibrium. If max{ps1, pm2 } > pc, then p1 = p2 and ϕ1(p1) =
ϕ2(p2) = 0.
Proof. First, we establish that pi ≤ pMi . Clearly, the semi-public firm’s
prices above pM1 would be strictly dominated by price pM1 (i.e. pi1(pM1 , ϕ2) >
pi1(p1, ϕ2) for any p1 > pM1 and any mixed strategy ϕ2 played by the private
firm). The case of p2 ≤ pM2 is even more obvious. Hence, the firms’ do not
set ‘extremely’ high prices.
Second, we demonstrate that p
1
≤ p
2
. Suppose to the contrary that p
1
>
p
2
. Then by p
2
< p2 ≤ pM2 the private firm would benefit from switching from
ϕ2 to any price p2 ∈ (p2, p1); a contradiction.
Third, we demonstrate that p
1
≥ p
2
. Suppose to the contrary that p
1
< p
2
.
Then by p
1
< p1 ≤ pM1 the public firm would benefit from switching from
ϕ1 to any price p1 ∈ (p1, p2) since the profit component of its payoff function
would increase and the social surplus component of its payoff function would
not change; a contradiction.
Forth, suppose that ϕ1(p1) > 0. Then for a sufficiently small ε > 0 price
p
1
−ε would strictly dominate price p
1
+ε for the private firm; a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that ϕ2(p2) > 0. Then for a sufficiently small ε > 0 price
p
2
− ε would strictly dominate price p
2
+ ε for the semi-public firm since its
profit component would be radically larger at the former price than at the
latter one by its discontinuity at p
2
, while the social surplus component would
be just slightly lower by the continuity of the social surplus component; a
contradiction.
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4 Determining the mixed-strategy equilibrium
in case of linear demand
Determining the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the standard Bertrand-
Edgeworth duopoly under fairly general conditions is a difficult task. The
semi-public version of this game appears to be even more difficult. There-
fore, in this section we focus on the case of linear demand and symmetric
capacities. Let D(p) = (1 − p)+, P (q) = (1 − q)+ and k = k1 = k2. Then
we have a non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies if and only if
k ∈ (1/3, 1). For the latter capacity region we get:
pm1 = p
m
2 =
1− k
2
, pd1 = p
d
2 =
(1− k)2
4k
, and ps1 =
1− α
2− α(1− k).
Social surplus equals:
SW (p1, p2) =
{
1
2
(1 + p1)(1− p1) = 12(1− p21) if p1 ≥ p2;
1
2
(1 + p2)(1− p2) = 12(1− p22) if p1 < p2.
Assume that there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium such that ϕ1(p2) =
0, which in turn implies p2 = pm2 and p2 = p
d
2. Then we find the mixed-
strategy equilibrium in a similar way as in the standard case of the game. In
equilibrium the private firm’s equilibrium profit equals pi2 = pd2k = pm2 (1 −
pm2 − k), which must be the case if the second case, i.e. p2 = pm2 in the
statement of Lemma 2 holds true. We shall denote the cumulative distribution
functions of the semi-public and the private firms by F and G, respectively.
The objective function of the semi-public firm, supposed that the private
firm plays its mixed strategy G, is given by
pi1(p1, G) = (1− α)p1k(1−G(p1)) + (1− α)p1(1− p1 − k)G(p1) +
α
1
2
(1− p21)G(p1) + α
1
2
∫ pm2
p1
(1− p22)dG(p2) = pi1, (4)
where the first line of (4) contains the profit component and the second line
of (4) the social surplus component of the semi-public firm’ s payoff function.
The private firm’s objective function, supposed that the semi-public firm
plays its mixed strategy F , is given by
pi2(F, p2) = p2k(1− F (p2)) + p2(1− p2 − k)F (p2) = pi2. (5)
Rearranging (5) we get
F (p2) =
p2k − pi2
p2(2k − 1 + p2) . (6)
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It can be verified that F (pd2) = 0, F (pm2 ) = 1 and F is strictly increasing on
[pd2, p
m
2 ].
The private firm’s equilibrium strategy can be obtained by solving
∂pi1
∂p1
(p1, G) = 0 and G(pd2) = 0. By differentiation we get
∂pi1
∂p1
(p1, G) = (1− α)k(1−G(p1))− (1− α)p1kg(p1)
+(1− α) [(1− p1 − k)G(p1)− p1G(p1) + p1(1− p1 − k)g(p1)]
−αp1G(p1) + 1
2
α(1− p21)g(p1)
−1
2
α(1− p21)g(p1)
= [(1− α)(1− 2p1 − 2k)− αp1]G(p1)
+(1− α)p1(1− p1 − 2k)g(p1) + (1− α)k = 0,
where g is the derivative of G, and the expression is just defined where G is
differentiable. Solving the first-order linear differential equation we get4
G(p1) = C
1
p1
(
1
2k + p1 − 1
) 1
1−α
+
k(1− α)
p1
(7)
and employing G(pd2) = 0 we arrive to
C = −k(1− α)
(
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
) 2
1−α
.
Unfortunately, G does not specify a cumulative probability distribution
function because it fails to be increasing on [pd2, pm2 ]. However, it is at least
increasing at pd2. We shall denote by p0 ∈ (pd2, pm2 ) the price for which g(p0) = 0
and p0 is a local maximum of G.5
Proposition 1. F (p) and G(p) given by
F (p) =

0 if p ∈ [0, pd2],
F (p) if p ∈ (pd2, p0],
1 if p ∈ (p0, b]
and G(p) =

0 if p ∈ [0, pd2],
G(p) if p ∈ (pd2, p0],
G(p0) if p ∈ (p0, pm2 ],
1 if p ∈ (pm2 , b],
where F and G stand for the functions determined by (6) and (7), respec-
tively. In particular, F has an atom at p0, while G has an atom at pm2 .
4Under our assumptions we have that 2k+p−1 = p−pc > 0 if k < 1/2 and 2p+k−1 > 0
if k ≥ 1/2.
5If g(p) = 0 has multiple solutions within p0 ∈ (pd2, pm2 ), then pick the smallest one.
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Proof. First, we establish that G(p) ≤ 1 for any p ∈ [pd2, pm2 ] by showing that
G(p) ≤ F (p) for any p ∈ [pd2, pm2 ]. (8)
Note that (8) holds with equality in case of p = pd2. (8) is equivalent with
C
(
1
2k + p− 1
) 1
1−α
+ k(1− α) ≤ pk − pi2
(2k + p− 1) , (9)
which we show by verifying that the derivative of the LHS is smaller than
that of the RHS for any p ∈ [pd2, pm2 ]:
C
1
1− α
(
1
2k + p− 1
) 1
1−α−1 −1
(2k + p− 1)2 ≤
k(2k + p− 1)−
(
pk − (1−k)2
4
)
(2k + p− 1)2
k
(
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
) 2
1−α
(
1
2k + p− 1
) α
1−α
≤
(
3
2
k − 1
2
)2
,
where the LHS of the last inequality achieves its maximum value on [pd2, pm2 ]
for a given k ∈ [1/3, 1] at p = pd2 = (1− k)2/(4k), and therefore(
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
) 2
1−α
(
1
2k + (1−k)
2
4k
− 1
) α
1−α
≤
(
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
)2
(
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
) 2
1−α
(
1
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
) 2α
1−α
≤
(
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
)2
,
and we can see that the last inequality holds with equality, and (8) follows.
Verifying that 0 ≤ G(p) for any p ∈ [pd2, pm2 ], can be obtained through simple
rearrangements and by employing again p ≥ pd2 = (1− k)2/(4k).
By (4) and (5) firms 1 and 2 achieve pi1 and pi2 payoffs, respectively, when
playing any of their pure strategies p ∈ [pd2, p0] against their opponents’ above
specified strategies (G and F ). Clearly, playing a price below pd2 results in
less payoff than pi1 and pi2, respectively. It is straightforward that the private
firm makes less profit by setting a price p2 ∈ (p0, pm2 )∪ (pm2 , b] than by setting
price pm2 , when playing against mixed strategy F , since for prices in (p0, b] it
serves residual demand with probability one.
We check that the socially concerned firm achieves less than pi1 payoff
when playing any pure strategy p1 ∈ (p0, pm2 ] against mixed strategy G.
Starting with (4) and as a slight modification of its solution G, we define G˜
for any pure strategy p1 ∈ [0, b] by G˜(p) = 0 on [0, pd2], by G(p) on (pd2, p1], by
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G˜(p) = G(p1) on (p1, pm2 ], and by G˜(p) = 1 on (pm2 , b] (which is not necessarily
a mixed strategy). Assuming that the mixed strategy of the private firm
would be mainly determined by G, but remains constant on [p1, pm2 ) and
jumps up to 1 at pm2 , which gives us function G˜, we determine the price level
p∗ for the socially concerned firm at which its payoff is maximized. However,
since G is not necessarily a cumulative density function because it might
have decreasing parts before p1, we just call the payoff function, which we
are maximizing based on G˜, as a ‘virtual payoff’ function and we will find out
that G is indeed increasing on [pd2, p∗], and therefore G˜ specifies a cumulative
density function p1 = p∗. The virtual payoff function of the socially concerned
firm is given by
z(p1) = pi
g
1(p1, G(p1)) = (1− α)p1k(1−G(p1))
+(1− α)p1(1− p1 − k)G(p1)
+α
1
2
(1− p21)G(p1)
+α
1
2
(1− (pm2 )2)(1−G(p1)), (10)
where pig1(p1, G(p1)) equals its real payoff if G is increasing until p1.
First, we will show that the sign of g equals the sign of z′(p1) =
dpig1(p1, G(p1))/dp1, which then would imply that p∗ = p0 and a function
of type G˜ cannot be cumulative density function in case of p1 > p0. To es-
tablish that p∗ = p0 we consider the derivative of the difference of (10) and
(4)
z(p1)−pi1(p1, G) = α
2
(1−G(p1))
(
1− (pm2 )2
)−α
2
∫ pm2
p1
(
1− p22
)
dG(p2), (11)
which equals
d
dp1
(z(p1)− pi1(p1, G)) = −α
2
g(p1)
(
1− (pm2 )2
)
+
α
2
(
1− p21
)
g(p1)
= −α
2
g(p1)
[(
1− (pm2 )2
)− (1− p21)] ,
and therefore, it follows that the signs of g and z are identical since
pi1(p1, G) = pi1 and [(1− (pm2 )2)− (1− p21)] < 0 in case of p1 < pm2 .
Finally, we really turn to proving that setting prices above p∗ results in
less payoff than pi1 for the socially concerned firm. For any p ∈ [p∗, pm2 ] we
have
pi1(p1, G) = (1− α)p1 [k(1−G(p∗)) + (1− p1 − k)G(p∗)]
+
α
2
[
(1− p21)G(p∗) + (1− (pm2 )2)(1−G(p∗))
]
(12)
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and
d
dp1
pi1(p1, G) = (1− α) [k(1−G(p∗)) + (1− 2p1 − k)G(p∗)]
−αp1G(p∗). (13)
In order to employ the results obtained so far we need the derivative of z:
z′(p1) = (1− α) [k(1−G(p1)) + (1− 2p1 − k)G(p1)]− αp1G(p1)
+(1− α) [−p1kg(p1) + p1(1− p1 − k)g(p1)]
+
α
2
[
(1− p21)g(p1)− (1− (pm2 )2)g(p1)
]
. (14)
By employing that p∗ maximizes z, and therefore z′(p∗) = 0, and g(p∗) = 0
we obtain from (14) that
z′(p∗) = (1− α) [k(1−G(p∗)) + (1− 2p∗ − k)G(p∗)]− αp∗G(p∗) = 0. (15)
Since the function appearing in (12) is strictly concave it has a unique max-
imum point, which then equals p∗ = p0 by taking (13) and (15) into consid-
eration.
The following two corollaries can be verified based on Proposition 1. The
first one states that the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly can be ob-
tained as a limiting case of semi-public Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies.
Corollary 1. If α→ 0, then G(p)→ F (p) for any p ∈ [0, b].
Proof. As we could see above, in equilibrium the private firm’s profit equals
pi2 = p
d
2k =
(1− k)2
4k
k =
(1− k)2
4
.
From (6) we get
F (p) =
pk − pi2
p(2k − 1 + p) =
pk − (1−k)2
4
p(2k − 1 + p) = −
1
4
k2 − 4pk − 2k + 1
p(2k − 1 + p).
If α→ 0, then from Proposition 1 and equation (7) we get for all p ∈ [pd2, pm2 ]
that
G(p) = −k
(
3
2
√
k − 1
2
√
k
)2
1
p
(
1
2k + p− 1
)
+
k
p
= −1
4
[
(3k − 1)2 1
p
(
1
2k + p− 1
)
− 4k
p
]
= −1
4
(3k − 1)2 − 4k(2k + p− 1)
p(2k + p− 1)
= −1
4
k2 − 4pk − 2k + 1
p(2k + p− 1) .
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The second corollary states that as the other limiting case one obtains
the mixed Bertrand-Edgworth duopoly investigated by Balogh and Tasnádi
(2012), where from the two or three pure-strategy equilibria appearing there
the NE2-type equilibrium will be approached.
Corollary 2. If α→ 1, then
(i) F (p)→ 1 for any p ∈ (pd2, pm2 ], and
(ii) G(p)→ 0 for any p ∈ [pd2, pm2 ].
Proof. From Proposition 1 and equation (15) it can be seen that p0 → pd2 as
α→ 1 which immediately implies (i) and (ii).
Now we state our main result on the optimal level of public ownership.
Proposition 2. The standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game yields the highest
social surplus, which would mean that even partial privatization would be
harmful in the semi-public framework.
Proof. First, observe that for the relevant price region [pd2, pm2 ] social sur-
plus is determined by the higher price set by the two firms. Furthermore,
social surplus is negatively related to the higher price. It can be verified that
F (p)G(p) is decreasing in α, where F (p) and G(p) are the mixed strategies of
the firms given in Proposition 1, from which the statement of the proposition
follows.
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